Friday, 19 June 2009

Universtität Wien - Juridicum - Seminarraum 64 (Stiege 2)

A-1010  WIEN, Schottenbastei 10-16

"Sanctioning Nuclear DPRK - UN Security Council Has to Decide on Urgent Crisis"

The negotiators were strongly recommended to read the rules of procedure and the UN SC resolutions on DPRK.

-          Rules of procedure: http://afa.at/vimun/rules2006.pdf

-          UN SC resolution 825 (1993): http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/280/49/IMG/N9328049.pdf?OpenElement

-          UN SC resolution 1540 (2004): http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement

-          UN SC resolution 1695 (2006): http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/431/64/PDF/N0643164.pdf?OpenElement

-          UN SC resolution 1718 (2006): http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement

-          Statement by the President of the SC 13 April 2009: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/301/03/PDF/N0930103.pdf

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Scenario

On 25 May 2009 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted a test of a nuclear weapon, followed by the launch of several ballistic missiles in the subsequent days. The test was immediately deplored by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and a UN Security Council emergency session was held upon the request of Japan. In this session, the SC condemned the test as a clear violation of its resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006), called for a return to the six- party talks and resolved to immediately start to work on a new resolution with a stronger content than in the previous ones. A draft resolution emerged five days on 28 May 2009, leaving the sanctions and immediate measures in paragraph 8 to be discussed.

In this scenario, we are simulating a SC session following the (internal) circulation of this draft resolution and focusing on the elaboration of paragraph 8.

II. Background

DPRK’s nuclear programme started with soviet help in the 1980s, on condition that it joined the NPT. Concerns about a supposed non-civilian use of nuclear energy have been raised since the 1970s, along with those about regional military provocations, proliferation of military-related items, and long-range missile development, and almost resulted in DPRK’s withdrawal from NPT in 1994. Faced with diplomatic pressure, DPRK agreed to dismantle its plutonium programme as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those reactors would be completed, making it easier to track reactor fuel and waste as the enriched uranium had to be imported. This agreement broke in 2002, following US accusations that that the DPRK would be pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on enriched uranium with key technology and information allegedly delivered by Pakistan. DPRK expelled IAEA monitors in December 2002 and declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. In mid-2003 it declared it was developing a "nuclear deterrent". In order to resolve the stalemate over DPRK’s nuclear programmes, its neighbours sought a diplomatic resolution for the crisis, resulting in the “Six-Party talks” held periodically in Beijing with China, DPRK, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Korea and the United States as participants. The first talks were held in August 2003, but their success was questioned at any time as the US-DPRK bilateral relations worsened increasingly. DPRK pulled out of the talks in November 2005, declaring to have nuclear weapons. It test-fired ballistic missiles in July 2006 and conducted its first nuclear bomb test in October 2006. After a 13 months postponement, the country returned to the Six-Party talks in mid-December 2006, signed two denuclearization agreements and in February 2007 the Initial Actions agreement was reached, leading to the shut down of three nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid as well as to admitting IAEA inspectors and aiming at the normalization of bilateral relations with Japan and the US. After US-Korean military exercises the DPRK threatened to bolster its nuclear deterrent, but followed the agreement by handing over a document detailing its capabilities in nuclear power and nuclear weapons in June 2008 and destroying another nuclear facility. Consequently, the US removed the DPRK from its “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list.

In the beginning of April 2009, the DPRK tested ballistic missiles. As the UN passed a resolution denouncing this, the DPRK pulled again out of the talks on 14 April 2009 and declared itself not to be further bound by the agreements. At the end of the month it declared to have reactivated its nuclear facilities. On 25 May 2009 the country tested a nuclear device for the second time. As a background for the change in DPRK’s foreign policy, internal matters, in particular the question of the change in leadership, were discussed. In the beginning of June 2009 the news of a new leader, Kim Jong Il’s youngest son Kim Jong Un, emerged.

III. Positions

UN Security Council permanent member states:

China

France

Russian Federation

United Kingdom

United States

UN Security Council non-permanent member states:

Austria

Burkina Faso

Costa Rica

Croatia

Japan

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Mexico

Turkey (Presidency in June 2009)

Uganda

Viet Nam